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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to evaluate and measure the e¤ect of …nancial liber-
alization (FL) on bank risk exposure. We pursue these questions by assessing the
changes in market-based asset values and risk exposure measures for commercial
banks (CB) before and during a FL program. We do this for a sample of three coun-
tries: Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We use a model based on the options pricing
theory. We obtain estimates of the …rst and second moment of bank returns using
an asset pricing model in which these two moments are a linear projection of a set
of conditioning variables. This model was estimated using a GMM statistical pro-
cedure. Then we perform regressions explaining the evolution of bank risk measure
around the FL event. The analysis and statistical test indicate that risk exposure
of banks increases following a FL program, and this as a result of macroeconomic
policy as well as changes in management controlled variables. This is so even for
banks operating in countries that have undertaken very cautious FL processes such
as Thailand and Malaysia. The results tend to support the proposition that moral
hazard and bank risk taking may increase following FL. The results also suggest that
banking crisis that often have followed FL may be more due to the behavior of banks
managers than previously reported in the FL literature.Financial Liberalization: Commercial Bank’s Blessing or
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Commercial Bank’s Blessing or Curse?
”...a liberalization is a serious macroeconomic shock” Sussman [1992]
”few monetary authorities are prepared to accept as reasonable any interest rate
level that is market determined.” Pereira Leite and Sundararajan [1990]
1 Introduction
Assume you are a regulator or banking authority (BA) who receives instructions by
the government to steer the banking system through a …nancial liberalization (FL)
process. In particular, you are responsible for ensuring that the banking system
rides through the FL process, suitably transformed, but in good health. Under the
circumstances, institutional failures are to be avoided. How do you measure the risk
exposure of banks or the probability of institutional failure as they go through the FL
process? This is hard to do given the range of factors that can a¤ect the solvency of a
bank, including: managerial factors; the solvency of the bank’s major borrowers; the
limited value of accounting information under changing conditions; macroeconomic
factors; etc.
The issue is important for a successful execution of a FL programs. The best laid
plans for a structural reform program that seeks to encourage capital ‡ows, savings
and investment in a country, can stumble when one or more …nancial institutions face
solvency problems provoking a panic in the system. The e¤ects of such panics can
be devastating, ranging from sudden monetary contraction to widespread …nancial
di¢culties in the productive sector and surges in unemployment. Bank solvency
problems may originate from a number of sources: increased corporate failure by
non-…nancial bank customers, run on deposits, imprudent lending activity by the
banks, are just a few examples.1 It is not unusual for economists planning and
supervising national economic reform programs, to ignore the microeconomic e¤ects,
specially in terms of risk exposure of business of all sort, of such programs. This is
not surprising considering that the change in risk exposure is generally absent of most
economic planning models guiding these programs. The link between some aspects
of FL and solvability of the banking sector has been addressed by some researchers.
Leite and Sundararajan [21] address the issue of interest rates liberalization and
bank ”soundness” in a study that proposes a set of policy tools for a safe FL process.
However, nowhere in the literature do we …nd an e¤ort to measure bank risk exposure
under FL.
1The 1995 Argentina …nancial crisis is a case in point. It was predominantly –if not only–a crisis
of con…dence in the banking sector. In the four months following the Mexican crisis, over 4 billion
dollars (around 10% of the total deposit base in the country) left the banking sector, most of it not
to leave the country, but –as the minister of economy D. Cavallo remarked– to be stu¤ed ”under
the mattress.” The international …nancing package obtained by Argentina in the following months
was largely used to establish a emergency deposit insurance scheme. The only purpose of this action
was to restore domestic savers con…dence in the banking system. The whole long-term restructuring
program of the Argentina economy was in danger following this banking crisis.
1Although it is true that several FL processes came and went without large (or
small) scale bank failures, the risk exists. Outright institutional debacles have oc-
curred following FL. Examples of this are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela among others. In e¤ect, many FL
processes have ended, and were terminated, with a major crisis in the banking sec-
tor. These crisis sometimes represent huge losses to governments, like in Venezuela
in 1994. There the government was forced to come up with a rescue package with
a value equivalent to 13% of GDP of Venezuela [33]. In Argentina, in the period of
six years following a FL initiated in 1977, almost 32% of the registered banking in-
stitutions disappeared. Often the actual absence of institutional failure results from
the conjectural government guarantee (CGG) or forbearance extended by the state
to ensure the solvency of the …nancial system throughout the FL process. This CGG
may not have been removed as part of the FL process, or may have been reinstated
when authorities perceived that the FL process puts the banking system in danger.
It is not our intention to question the legitimacy of FL. Rather, we seek to study
the e¤ect of these reforms on the functioning of the banking system and to develop
instruments that allow a better monitoring of banks under conditions of FL. The
exhaustion of the controlled import-substitution model of economic growth left many
countries with no option but to engage markets to resume growth or escape recession.
Many are doing this in a radical way. It is by no means evident that, despite the
wave of FL observable in almost every continent, many forms of controls on credit
and interest rates may be very useful to promote economic growth and social justice.
Recently Vittas and Cho [35] have reviewed the practices of directing credit alloca-
tion, a prominent form of …nancial repression, and found that some experiences (such
as Korea and Japan) suggest that these credit programs can promote investment and
growth.
To get a better grip of the issue we make, as Kryzanowski and Roberts [20], and
King [19] a distinction between economic insolvency and institutional failure. More
speci…cally we approach Demirgüc-Kunt’s [5] de…nition of “market value insolvency”
focusing on the probability that the market value of assets exceeds the market value
of liabilities.2 We view the methodology used more as part of an ”early warning
system” (EWS) to anticipate hazardous situations rather than to obtain point esti-
mates of bankruptcy risk or deposit insurance premiums. The model we use draws
from the options pricing theory. It exploits the information contained in both, the
bank accounting data and the public information pool contained in the price index
of banks, about the banking system’s performance. In the option pricing context
securities issued by the banking sector are claims whose value is contingent upon
the value of assets and liabilities of the bank. Thus, changes in the prices of bank
stocks (observable) provide the researcher a window into the market’s assessment of
both the expected performance of the bank and the value of the portfolio of loan
assets (both not observable). We go further to investigate the even more pertinent
2In her classi…cation of failure de…nitions, Demirgüc-Kunt identi…es four di¤erent concepts of
bank failure: book value insovency, market value insolvency, o¢cial (De Jure) insolvency, and De
Facto failure. See [5], table 2, for details.
2question of the change in risk of failure that these ‡uctuations suggest. Thus, we go
on to compute probabilities of bank failure that results from comparing the value of
bank’s assets and liabilities. Insolvency risk is generally considered by bank supervi-
sors and in Basle directives to be a key measure of bank performance (in contrast for
example with the securities industry, where liquidation risk is considered of more im-
portance). Bank insolvency risk is also the central point of concern in the 1993 bank
capital adequacy directive (CAD) of the European Union that seeks to harmonize
bank regulation across member states. We also compute an hypothetical insurer’s
contingent liability, valued as a put option bought by the bank from the insurer.
This latter measure provides an excellent thermometer of the change in the bank’s
risk exposure with time, under any circumstance, including FL. 3 This approach has
the advantage of assessing indirectly variable that, although critical to monitor bank
solvency, cannot be inferred directly from accounting data generated by banks. For
the purpose of this study, the emphasis is not on the point estimates of either bank
insolvency probability or fair deposit insurance premium. Rather, being preoccupied
by the e¤ect of institutional changes on bank performance, we focus on the changes in
these values with time and events. Under these circumstances a bias in the estimates
in one or the other direction is of little importance.
2 Financial liberalization and the banking sector
FL is complex processes and its e¤ect on the banking sector is only partially un-
derstood. In this section we will attempt to analyze the incentives a ”typical” FL
introduces in the bank management process and some of the foreseeable consequences.
When applicable we will refer readers to the relevant literature.
2.1 FL: what does it do to commercial banks?
FL can change considerably the business environment of …nancial intermediaries.
This is so because it changes radically the macroeconomic, legal and regulatory frame-
work under which banks operate. Obviously, the sector that is most a¤ected by FL
is the commercial banking sector. Commercial banks can be a¤ected directly or in-
directly. Directly, because commercial banks are often the immediate targets of the
liberalization process. Indirectly, because liberalization usually modi…es the decision
parameters used by both banks and non-…nancial bank customers to make …nancing
decisions.
The simplest possible de…nition of FL is removal of …nancial repression (FR). FR
consists of a set of restrictions on market competition that yields a protected environ-
ment for …nancial intermediaries. The most common restrictions are: 1. Guaranteed
intermediation margin through …xation of lending and deposit rates or direct subsidy
programs (see for example Gibson and Tsakalotos [11]); 2. Controls on international
capital ‡ows and foreign competition; 3. Barriers to exit for …nancial intermediaries
3We thank Prof. Van S. Lai for convincingly suggesting the use of this latter measure as an
indicator of a bank’s health.
3often accompanied by unlimited (conjectural) deposit insurance; 4. Barriers to exit
for major industrial clients of …nancial intermediaries, i.e. conjectural loan insurance
for the largest loans in the portfolio; 5. Guaranteed business activity through gov-
ernment funded credit allocation programs to key economic sectors. A FL program
consists of the simultaneous removal of all or part of these restrictions. Of all restric-
tion, the one that is central to FR is …xation of interest rates. Therefore, as Galvis[9]
4 we take relaxation or lifting of controls on interest rates as the central event of FL.
Now, to see the impact of FL, consider the following list of measures and the
consequences they may have on bank pro…tability and risk exposure. We summarize
these e¤ects in Table 1
Table 1 goes here
2.1.1 Elimination of deposit and lending rates controls.
² Description: This regulatory change has four separate e¤ects on banks:
– Interest rate uncertainty: The immediate result of lifting controls is often
an increase in the level and volatility of deposit and lending rates. Rate
levels increase to bring them within a positive in‡ation-adjusted range.
The increase in volatility may be caused by several factors of which we
emphasize two: portfolio shifts and competition for funds. Portfolio shifts
follow the elimination of rate controls, a form of market segmentation.
These shifts occur when borrowers and lenders readjusts their positions to
the new market conditions. Competition for funds is likely to be intense
following a FL. Deregulation of rates can, and often do, lead to price
wars as banks seek to capture market shares in a phenomenon similar to
the one observed following the deregulation of the United States airline
industry. These wars may be encouraged by the existence oligopolistic
structure in the banking sector, a common phenomena among EM. The
enhanced volatility can persist over a relatively long transition period until
the market settles into an equilibrium point where speculation in, and
arbitrage between di¤erent market segments, becomes less pro…table.
– Intermediation margin: Removal of controls (of borrowing and lending
rates) eliminates the implicitly guaranteed intermediation margin (IM)
and rent for the bank. Under the new environment banks may be forced
to compete for deposits and loan costumers, squeezing their pro…t margins.
The presence of oligopolistic power in the …nancial sector could imply that
while some banks strive using their relative market power position, others
may …nd the new competitive environment di¢cult to endure. Further,
if banks accomplish any maturity transformation at all, an increase in
4This author goes as far as stating ’FL is the elimination of FR, that is, increase of interest rates
to an e¢cient equilibrium level that promotes optimal saving rates and avoids misalocation of real
and …nancial resources.’
4deposit rates will not result in an automatic increase in rates of outstand-
ing assets. The now almost-forgotten wave of American S&LA failures in
the early eighties due to the rise (quite moderate by emerging-markets’
standards) of deposit rates following President Carter’s Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, is a
stark reminder of the e¤ect such an unilateral shift in rates may have on
bank performance.
– Risk taking: Elimination of ceilings on deposit and lending rates changes
the incentives for risk taking activities by banks facilitating moral-hazard
problems in the industry. More concretely, it encourages risk taking and
expands the opportunities for doing so.5 Controlled lending rates encour-
aged banks to seek projects with low risk as lending rates cannot be ad-
justed to account for risk and moral hazard. With liberation of interest
rates, increases in deposit rates practically forces banks to seek lending at
higher rates in projects that are likely to be riskier. Lifting of lending-rate
controls also reinforces the incentives for banks to seek to …nance borrow-
ers willing to pay higher rates-higher risk projects. If deposit rates would
be fairly priced according to the asset risk exposure of each bank, no ben-
e…t would accrue to bank shareholders. However, in absence of such a fair
pricing, given a cost of deposits (or unlimited CGG), agency theoretic ar-
guments suggest that bank shareholders gain by seeking projects of higher
risk. A fair pricing mechanism will surely not exist in the presence of a
deposit insurance schemes (conjectural or explicit) at …xed rates. If the FL
reduces the intermediation margin as a result of competition, this will also
encourage banks to engage in lending to more risky customers to increase
returns on funds placed. The phenomena of bank risk taking has also
been analyzed in the context of DIDMCA of 1980 and the Garn-St. Ger-
main Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (see e.g. Pantalone and Platt,
[28] and Keeton,[18] and [?] on empirical evidences of the link between
…nancial deregulation and risk-taking behavior in the United States) 6.
– Quality of asset portfolio: Volatility (usually with a marked increase) in
interest rates will increase both …nancing costs and failure risk of bank
non-…nancial costumers. The quality of bank assets will deteriorate ac-
cordingly.
5It is remarcable that, in one of the most thorough and candid analysis of the Mexican banking
crisis made by a Mexican public …gure, Mr. Miguel Mancera Aguayo [22], the governor of the
Bank of Mexico, fails to even mention as a problem the shift in risk taking activities of commercial
banks following the FL in that country. It is worth noting that the hughe loan default rates was
one important element in the crisis that lead to the establishment by the government of a resque
package. This package consisted of over 11 billion dollars of taxpayer’s money in direct …nancing to
commercial banks. In addition a parallel Support to Non-performing Borrowers’ Program (Acuerdo
para el Apoyo de Deudores, ADE) with loan restructuring facilities of up to 30 years was also put in
place. We do not have information about the cost to taxpayers of this program.
6See also Corbo, de Melo and Tybout [3] for some details of bank risk-taking practices during the
FL experiences in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.
5² E¤ect: The overall result of the elimination of deposit and lending rates controls
is that banks may face increased pro…t-making opportunities. However, they
will also be exposed to a considerable increase in interest rate and asset portfolio
risk. The e¤ect will generally not be uniform for banks of di¤erent size.
2.1.2 Deregulation and/or re-regulation of …nancial markets.
² Description: Again, there are several e¤ects that come into action. These mea-
sures consist mostly of elimination of regulated specialization of …nancial insti-
tutions and promotion of new …nancial instruments and markets (e.g. bonds
and stock markets, …nancial derivatives, etc.).
– Disintermediation. This process can generate strong incentives for mar-
ket participants to engage in alternate forms of …nancial intermediation,
in particular through securitized markets (disintermediation) 7. Diversi-
…cation of …nancial instruments in the economy is generally considered a
desirable e¤ect in a global sense, since it has the e¤ect of ”completing the
markets”. However, the consequences of disintermediation on individual
banks may not be that bene…cial. On the liability side, availability of new
…nancial instruments encourage the reallocation of funds to more compet-
itive markets. Again, DIDMCA is a good example. Massive amounts of
funds shifted out of the American banking sector into, mainly, a booming
mutual fund sector. Under deregulation, mutual funds could provide bank-
like services to depositors. Banks are thus forced to compete for deposits
increasing the costs of funds. On the asset side, non-…nancial enterprises
…nd it advantageous to raise funds through alternative mechanisms such
as domestic stocks or bonds, or quite often, in the international bond and
stock markets. Major borrowers, usually those with the highest credit rat-
ing, may thus reduce their demand for bank originated funds. Bank are
forced to shift their loan portfolio to smaller customers, often more risky
and with higher information asymmetry.
– Risk taking Elimination of ”…rewalls ” and opening the opportunities to a
wider range of banking activities also provides new opportunities for risk
taking and moral-hazard. In some emerging markets banks are given the
chance to operate as universal banks (e.g., Mexico, Thailand) thus en-
abling them to pro…t from these new opportunities. But, even if universal
banking is allowed, this is often a new line of business in which bankers
may possess little or no experience. Cole et all.[?] provide evidence of
moral hazard problems associated with asset diversi…cation in S&LA in
the United States after DIDMCA.
² E¤ect: The overall e¤ect may be a fall in the relative importance of the banking
sector and increased asset risk. In a rapidly expanding economy, the growth
7See Merton [24] for an interesting discussion on the competitive interaction between …nancial
intermediaries and …nancial markets in a secular as well as a deregulatory context.
6in assets may compensate for this loss. However, if FL is not accompanied by
adequate growth, the e¤ect would be a shrinking of the banks’ balance sheet
with reduction on both the assets and liabilities.
2.1.3 Economic reform.
² Description: Most FL programs are not undertaken in isolation. On the con-
trary, usually they are part of a larger package of economic reforms that include
liberalization of the domestic good and international trade markets, cuts and
shifts in government spending, changes in monetary and exchange rates poli-
cies, elimination of industrial subsidies, etc. Often, the package of FL is part
of a ”structural adjustment program” sponsored by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), that contains provisions for international trade, monetary
and …scal policies. The consequences of these reforms on the performance of
…rms can be quite varied. This in turn a¤ects the credit quality of the banks’
portfolios. Some bank customers may indeed succeed and ‡ourish in this new
competitive environment. Those …rms unable to adapt or those that exist for
the sole purpose of exploiting the rents resulting from a particular form of mar-
ket segmentation, may su¤er. While the success of the winners will not improve
much portfolio performance (because of the non- residual nature of loan assets),
the failure of the looser will re‡ect negatively on the performance of assets. In
particular this will re‡ect on the non-performing portfolio of banks. Under
these circumstances, banks often see the need to charge higher risk premiums
on (now liberalized) loan rates charged to customers. While this may increase
the pro…tability of banks in the short term, this higher premiums enhances the
high credit-risk created by economic reforms 8. Roe [30] is one author that
has emphasized this relationship in what he calls ”the macro-micro feedback
process” although in the context of highly controlled markets rather than FL.
² E¤ect: The resulting e¤ect should be a short term increase in intermediation
margins obtained from higher risk customers accompanied by a relative increase
of non-performing loans in the long run.
2.1.4 Elimination of barriers to entry and exit.
² Description Under FR, the survival of banks and major non-…nancial enterprises
is conjecturally but e¤ectively guaranteed by the state. 9 Elimination of barriers
to exit (removal of CGG) –as occurred e.g. in the early 1980’s in Argentina
and Brazil– changes considerably both, the liquidity of the banks and the credit
quality of the banks’ loan portfolios. This e¤ect can be particularly severe in
8It is now a fairly established belief among Mexican economists that the current peak of non-
performing bank portfolios is largely self-induced. Firms were facing two simultaneous shocks, the
high risk associated with the sudden and almost total liberalization of international trade, and the
high risk-adjusted loan rates charged by banks
9It is by no means unusual in repressed economies for the state to step in and rescue an enterprise
whose insolvency would endanger the liquidity of a bank or an important number of jobs.
7the absence of a deposit insurance scheme in place, a situation that is quite
common in EM. Further, if FL also opens the market to domestic and foreign
competition, elimination of barriers to entry increases competitive pressure on
the banking system.
² E¤ect The e¤ect of this particular measure can be quite complex. On the
liabilities side of the balance sheet, removal of CGG reduces savers con…dence in
the solvability of the bank and discourages deposit–or shifts them from smaller
or less solvable banks to larger or ”to big to fail” banks. Thus, one e¤ect
could be a relative shrinking of deposits with smaller bank. On the asset side,
elimination of barriers to exit of industrial customers could a¤ect negatively
the non-performing portfolio.
2.1.5 Adoption of international (BIS) capital standards
² Description: The adoption of the BIS or similar capital standards often ac-
companies FL. It has been argued (Breeden and Isaac, [2]; Wojnilower, [37];
Haubrich and Wachtel, [14]; Thakor, [34] and Berger and Udell, [1]) that risk-
based capital standards (RBCS) can be viewed as a regulatory tax that is higher
for asset items that are assigned a higher risk rating. Since equity capital is
more expensive than any other source of fund, RBCS encourage substitution
of risky assets for low risk assets, predominantly treasury securities. This leads
to a credit crunch or reduction in the supply of credit to the business sector.
This credit crunch, juxtaposed to the increase in interest rates, complicates
the …nancing picture of business enterprises and, consequently, the value of the
bank’s loan portfolio.
² E¤ect: The e¤ects of this measures are hard to detect in the banks’ balance
sheet. However, one observable e¤ect should be a relative increase of holdings
in government securities.
2.1.6 Bank supervision and enforcement powers.
Elimination of unlimited conjectural government guarantees on deposits and controls
over the …nancial system price setting and allocation mechanisms is often accompa-
nied by increased supervision of banks to guarantee the safety of the system. This is
so because FL introduces many incentives and opportunities for pro…t and risk taking
thus reducing the safety of the banking system. There exist a reciprocal relation be-
tween the value of the deposit insurance one side and covenant rights to surveillance
and seize bank assets on the other, if one wishes to keep the safety of the system
relatively constant (see e.g. Merton and Bodie, [25]). Now, the essentials compo-
nents of a …nancially repressed system can often be eliminated quite easily given a
reasonable political will. This, as we have seen, introduces considerable uncertainty
into the banking system. For example, control on interest rates (deposit and lend-
ing), controls on international capital ‡ows, economic reforms, etc. can usually be
8eliminated by a simple decree. However, the same cannot be said of bank super-
vision. Often, central banks or bank superintendents of developing countries must
perform the supervision duty using company laws that apply to standard industrial
enterprises. These company laws may not provide bank supervisory bodies with the
power and ‡exibility in terms of disclosure requirements, ability of taking over the
control of the bank, etc. available to bank regulators of most industrialized countries.
The case of a single insolvent bank can languish over years in court putting into ques-
tion the safety of the whole banking system. Thus, a FL processes that is undertaken
without empowering the supervisory body to take rapid control of a critical situation
through changes in company laws, adds considerably to the already inherently high
uncertainty associated to the program
Although it is unlikely that all these developments will be felt simultaneously, it
is very likely that several of these scenarios may present themselves concurrently in
most FL processes. The overall e¤ect of the set of measures that accompany FL is
to create incentives for banks to increase pro…t making while increasing interest rate
and asset risk. Some aspects of the e¤ect produced by FL are similar to the ones
outlined by Keeley [17], Furlong and Keeley [8], Furlong [7], Keeton [18] and others
following deregulation in the United States. In the latter case the main argument
is that deregulation may have decreased charter value, specially for institutions in
protected local markets that had been relying on non-price competition to attract
funds and borrowers. This, in turn may have reduced incentives for bankers to act
prudently with regard to risk taking.
2.2 Financial liberalization in the countries under study
To help the presentation of this complex process, we provide a summary of the evolu-
tion of the regulatory and institutional framework associated to the banking system
in the countries under study.
Malaysia
The FL process of Malaysia is probably one of the most gradual and also less radical.
To a large extent the banking sector in this country is still one of the most protected
not only of the sample used in this study but of all Asian countries that have initiated
a FL process. A slow FL process started in the early 1970s, accelerated in 1978 with
the freeing of several interest rates, but was halted in 1983. Interest rates on all
priority sectors, that cover a very substantial portion of the bank0s portfolios, came
again under direct control by the central bank. This reversal accompanied a strong
contraction in the …scal de…cit brought on by an attempt to soften the e¤ects of global
recession and high oil prices. Between 1985 and 1987 the banking sector went through
a period of turmoil that ended with the bail-out of four major banks including Bank
Bumiputra, the largest bank in the country.
In 1987 deposit rates were liberated and banks were allowed to lend up to 4% above
the base lending rate (BLR, the local equivalent of the prime rate) …xed by the central
bank, Bank Negara Malaysia. In 1989 the Banking and Financial Institutions Act
9was implemented providing an integrated bank supervision framework. Supervision
of foreign banks was made possible by forcing foreign banks to incorporate locally.
Simultaneously, new risk-weighted capital adequacy standards were put in place.
Banks were given until the end of 1990 to comply with these standards. Finally in
February 1991 banks were allowed the freedom to set their own BLR, however they
remain restricted on the premium they can charge over this rate to 4%. Consumer
and mortgage rates remain controlled.
The FL process of Malaysia, given its gradualism, appears to be progressing
smoothly. None of the elements of banking crisis that have accompanied other FL of
Asia and Latin America appear to trouble Malaysia.
Taiwan
The banking sector comprises 13 government-controlled full service banks and a num-
ber of medium sized private banks and credit cooperatives. Liberalization started
quite slowly and, as of 1995, does not appear to have run into any serious di¢cul-
ties. It was argued that this restraint was due to the fact that repression suits many
interest. Blue-chip borrowers enjoyed a cozy relationship with government banks,
bureaucrats enjoyed power, perks and job security. A …rst e¤ort towards liberal-
ization was done in 1980 with the promulgation of the Essentials of Interest Rate
Adjustment, under which interest rates on CDs and other money market instruments
were partially deregulated. Also a greater range of di¤erence between maximum and
minimum loan rates was permitted.
Then, in March 1985 ten leading banks -including the Bank of Taiwan, Taipei City
Bank, China International Commercial Bank- were allowed to announce their prime
rate, and which were determined by banks individually according to their own position
and market conditions. This is perhaps the point in the process that launches the FL
os Taiwan. In 1986 the government liberalized deposit rates. Deposit categories on
which the CB determined interest rate ceilings were reduced from thirteen to four,
giving banks greater latitude in competing for deposits. Before, banks were locked
into a …xed spread with ‡oors and ceilings set by the government according to the
Regulation for the Control of Interest Rates of 1947. The same year, some foreign
banks that had been in Taiwan for at least …ve years were allowed to open branches
but with very limited functions.
In July 1989, coinciding with the arrival of Mr. Samuel Shieh, an assiduous pro-
moter of internationalization and liberalization of the …nancial markets as governor
of the Central Bank, a new banking law was passed. With the law started a slow
privatization program that reduced the government holdings in the three leading
commercial banks: First Commercial, Huan Nan and Chang Hwa. Also, under the
law, domestic banks had to meet the 8% capital/asset ratio set by the BIS and the
stage was set for further interest rates deregulation. Foreign banks were allowed to
take long-term deposits and make long-term loans and eventually enter the consumer
lending market. Lending and deposit rates were de…nitively liberalized, with the
abolition of ceilings and ‡oor limits on both rates. In 1990 restrictions on US dollar
holdings by Taiwanese banks were relaxed; a US dollar interbank market was created;
10the amount of NT dollars that could be moved out of the country by resident was
increased; and the holding of foreign currency deposits by residents in overseas banks
was made easier.
In 1991, 16 new commercial banks were licensed. The new banks were permitted
to open only …ve branches in addition to their headquarters and savings departments.
Fifteen of these banks came into existence on January 1, 1992, in “one full swoop
”, almost doubling the number of domestic banks in the country. The China Trust
was transformed into a commercial bank. In that year, the Ministry Of Finance also
liberalized the credit card business and the short-term money market. In 1994, the
inward ‡ow of capital was liberalized with the permission for foreign parties to open
Taiwan dollar accounts. The CB put no ceilings on inward remittances, although it
retained the right to screen remittances exceeding 100,000 US dollars.
Finally, on January 5, 1995, the Cabinet approved a blueprint for a three-phase
program to enhance Taiwan’s capability to become a regional …nancial center in-
termediating funds for foreign and domestic …rms in the Asian Paci…c region. The
measures include: further elimination of restrictions on operations by foreign banks,
revisions to rules on international …nancial transactions, o¤ering incentives for an
o¤shore …nancial center and allowing domestic individuals to open currency accounts
in the o¤shore …nancial centers.
Thailand
Thailand can be viewed as a case of gradual but radical FL. Whether it will be pos-
sible to say in the future that it also was ”safe, ” is something that remains to be
seen. A …rst gentle move of FL was undertaken in Thailand in 1980, when lend-
ing and depository rates raised by 3% from the statutory limit imposed since 1924.
Ceilings have since been adjusted frequently. A stronger FL move came in 1989. In
June of that year longer maturity time deposit rates were allowed to ‡oat. This was
followed in March 1990 with the removal of interest rate ceilings on all time deposits
and loans. Finally in January 1992, interest rates controls were eliminated on all
savings deposits. This moves on interest rates were accompanied by a package of
other measures including: liberalization of transactions in which banks are allowed
to engage (including international, foreign exchange, debt underwriting, market mak-
ing in government securities, fund management, etc.); liberalization of international
capital ‡ows and liberalization and development of alternative …nancial markets. In
1992, the credit allocation quota system was relaxed and new legislation allowed the
establishment of Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) with eurobanking
powers. Foreign and domestic banks were eligible to open BIBF. In January 1993 BIS
capital requirement guidelines were put into force with all banks given until Decem-
ber 1994 to comply. In February 1995, the government announces that the number
of full branch banking licenses would be increased by nearly 50% by May 1996, with
foreign banks (already with a presence through BIBF) allowed to compete with do-
mestic banks for those licenses. Parallel to this regulatory changes, the government
reduces its ownership stake in the banking system. In 1989, 10% of the government
controlled shares of Kung Thai Bank (KTB) were sold to the public. In 1993 the
11government sells further stakes of the KTB and the Bank of Asia (BoA).
Even with a massive increase in lending activity following the FL, there is no indi-
cation that the Thailand banking system faces serious solvency problems.10 However,
the Bank of Thailand appears to forecast some problems ahead. It has explicitly ex-
pressed a warning that smaller, weaker banks may …nd it di¢cult to survive in the
increasingly competitive banking environment. Thus they may be forced into mergers
with larger competitors.
3 The model and statistical methodology
3.1 The model
The model is based on the option’s principle that a bank’s equity can be viewed as a
derived asset (a call option) whose value depends upon the value of the bank’s asset,
mostly the portfolio of loans. For the latter there is usually no observable market
value. Book values are imperfect estimators of the true value of these assets. As
is usually the case in adapting the options pricing model to corporate …nance, we
assume that the bank’s assets follow a Wiener process,
dA=A = ¹Adt + ¾Ad! (1)
where ¹Adt represents the instantaneous expected change in asset value, ¾A is
the instantaneous standard deviation of asset values changes and d! is a white noise.
Adding the standard ”frictionless” market assumption two major results follow. First,
if the bank’s stock represents a call option on the bank’s assets the following relation
between the value of stock, V , and the value of assets, A;¾A, and the value (exercise
price) of liabilities, D including deposits and preferred stock can be established:
V = AN(d1) ¡ DN(d1 ¡ ¾A
p
T) (2)
where N(.) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution, T represents











In contrast to Black and Scholes, in our context as in that of Ronn and Verma
[1986] and Giammarino et.al.[1989], the nominal value of liabilities is the present
10This, in spite of the fact that in March, 1995, the Bank of Thailand saw it necessary to impose a
limit on lending growth of 24% (in Baht and US$) per year on all domestic and foreign banks. Bank
asset expansion had reached a peak of 30.3% per year in January of 1995
11The formulation given here di¤ers from the more recent applications of the model in that it does
not incorporate a coe¢cient for bank supervisor’s forbearance, ½. The reason is that in this paper
we not interested in establishing whether banks pay a fair deposit insurance premium. Rather. we
look at the change with time of the variables of interest. Traditionally ½ is introduced into equation
(2) as a constant, ½ < 1:0. It is likely that forbearance changes with FL, but this is another issue
altogether. We also ignore dividend payments (see e.g. King [19]).
12value of the exercise price of the option. Thus the risk-free interest rate does not
appear in the equation. Second, Merton [1974] also shows that applying Ito’s lemma,








where ¾V is the instantaneous standard deviation of the process dV=V . In this
system of two equations (2) and (3), only the value of equity, V; and the current face
value of liabilities, D, can be observed directly. The variable ¾V can be observed
only indirectly. It represents the market’s estimate, at time t ¡ 1 given the current
information set, of the instantaneous standard deviation of the process dV=V over the
period until expiration of the option. It is, thus, a conditional standard deviation,
conditioned upon the information set -t¡1. We will have more to say about the
estimation of ¾V later. This leaves a system of two equations with two unknown
variables, A and ¾A, that can be solved simultaneously.
We now proceed to compute two measures of insolvency risk. One is the probability
of insolvency, P(X) = P(A · D), and the other is the fair deposit insurance premium,
Od. The actual probability of institutional failure is function of many other factors
besides the market’s implicit assessment A and/or P(X). Similarly, deposit insurance
premium does not exist in most emerging markets. In those few where this type of
insurance exists, banks pay, as in the United States, a …xed premium. In this study we
are less interested by the actual institutional liquidation probability or the premium
a bank would have to pay if it decides to insure its deposits, than by the evolution
of bank risk exposure that accompanies a FL process. Thus, we will focus on the
relative change of P(X) and Od with the passage of time and the application of FL.
3.1.1 Measuring insolvency risk
Insolvency occurs when the value of liabilities (excluding capital) exceeds the value
of assets. We focus not on the ex-post bankruptcy states but rather on the ex-
ante bankruptcy probability implied in the market’s value assessment of bank stocks.
Presumably, if the probability of insolvability is high enough, BA will intervene to
take remedial action. More often than not, remedial action does not imply orderly
liquidation of assets, but rather an exercise of CGG. The probability of bankruptcy
can best be viewed in the context of options. Bankruptcy will occur if the stochastic
value of assets is less than the exercise price of the option, the face value of debt. It is
a well known fact of options theory, that d2 = d1¡¾A
p
T in equation (2) is standard
normal variable and that the cumulative represents the probability that the price of
the underlying asset exceeds the strike price. Thus the probability of bankruptcy is
given by
13P(X) = P(A · D)
= 1 ¡ P(A ¸ D)
= 1 ¡ N(d2)























with every term as de…ned before.
3.1.2 The price of deposit insurance premium
Now, given estimated values of A and ¾A, the deposit insurer’s contingent liability is
valued as a put option:















and Di is the face value of insured debt.12. Od represents, as the insolvency risk,
a measure of the bank’s risk exposure. To get values that are independent of the
size of deposits we set od = Od=Di. Thus od represents the insurance a bank would
have to pay for each dollar or multiple of dollar of deposits. An increase (decrease)
in the insurance premium per dollar of deposit indicates an increase (decrease) in the
insolvency risk of the bank. As such it represents an excellent measure of the risk
exposure of banks under any context.
3.2 Statistical methodology
The statistical procedure consist of three distinct steps: i) estimation of conditional
variances of stock returns, V 2
t ; ii) solution of the system of non-linear equations (2)
and (3) for the value of the bank’s assets,A, and conditional variances of asset returns,
¾2
At; iii) estimation of stock price implied probability of bank bankruptcy. Now the
details.
3.2.1 Estimation of conditional expected returns, E[rjt j -t¡1] and vari-
ances of stock returns, ¾2
t j -t¡1
The …rst step is to obtain an estimate of the conditional variance of returns of bank
stocks. A procedure frequently used in the literature is to compute the variance over
12This methodology, and variations of it, have been used by several authors. Examples are Ronn
and Verma [31], Giammarino, Schwartz and Zechner [10], and follows Merton [23]. We were not able
to distinguish between deposits and borrowings. Thus we assumed that all liabilities are insured.
14a moving window of past returns that varies from 12 months on a monthly basis [e.g.
Noah and Roy, 1994; Furlong, 1988; Ronn and Verma, 1986] or on a daily basis [
Giammarino et al., 1989]. We do not adopt this procedure because it supposes that,
at each point in time, the historical standard error is equal to the conditional standard
error. We employ an alternative methodology that makes use of recent theoretical and
empirical developments in asset pricing technology. Consider a model that assumes
the conditional …rst and second moments to be a linear function of the conditioning
variables as follows:
Et[rt;t+¿] = Xt¯;
log(¾2[rt;t+¿]) = log(¾2[rt;t+¿ ¡ Xt¯]) = Xt°
(7)
where Xt is the vector of conditioning variables, and ¾2[:] is the variance, condi-
tional on information available at time t. This speci…cation is very similar to that of
Whitelaw [1994]. It has the advantage that it introduces very little structure into the
pricing mechanism and the relation between moments. We di¤er in that, to guaran-
tee a positive variance, we take the logarithm of the conditional variance, ¾2[:], in an
approach similar to the EGARCH of Nelson [26].13
We used the same conditioning set as Harvey’s [12] set of ’domestic’ information
variables. It consisted of a constant, lagged returns on the market index, the real
exchange rate, U.S. 1-mo TBills, the spread between U.S. 1-mo and 3-mo TBills, the
U.S. 10-years Government Bond, domestic in‡ation, the world dividend yield and
a dummy for liberalization (the latter not part of Harvey’s set). A simultaneous
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of the system provides asymp-
totically correct and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Thus, in addition
of obtaining estimates of conditional moments, the procedure permits us to make










Once the series of ¾V was obtained we computed a forward-looking moving average
of ¾V , ¾V . The purpose of this transformation is to eliminate some of the variability
of the series of ¾V . Further, this procedure introduces some of the forward-looking
information that is usually available in the market at any point in time and that
cannot be captured by a purely technical forecast as the one obtained from estimating
(7).
Now, estimating conditional moments by exploiting the heteroscedastic properties
of the variance, is fundamentally inconsistent with the Black-Scholes options pricing
model. This model assumes constant variance over the options holding period. One
solution to this dilemma is to use a stochastic volatility options pricing model as
13We also tested a one-factor and a two-factor conditional CAPM model similar to the one applied
successfully to United states data by Song [32], with up to three ARCH lags. As in Song the
two factors were the market return and interest rates. We abandoned the Song model in favor of
the one by Whitelaw [36] when Hansen’s overidentifying restrictions tests consistently rejected the
orthogonality conditions used in the estimation of both, the two-factor and the one-factor models.
This latter model yields a just-identi…ed model.
15proposed by Hull and White [15]. The down side of using this methodology is that
the value of an options is much harder to compute. To our knowledge no author has
evaluated bank asset values using this methodology. Further, there is very little to
gain because, as Hull and White themselves put it: ’the bias caused by stochastic
volatility is surprisingly small.’ The only exception is for deep out-of-the-money
options, our equivalent of banks whose asset value are far below the value of liabilities.
Essentially, hopelessly bankrupt banks. Jorion [16] encounters a similar problem
when analyzing the foreign exchange market. He also chooses to live with theoretical
inconsistency. Another solution is to use, as other authors before, historical standard
errors. In other words, use an established methodology. The problems with this
solution is that even this established methodology is forced to assume, implicitly, that
volatility is time-varying. This is so because volatility is computed over a moving
window of …xed duration. Given these contradictions we decided to be pragmatic.
We computed volatilities using both the conditional moments forecasting model (7)
and historical volatilities using a moving window of 12 months. Then, we computed
correlation coe¢cients between these estimates and realized volatilities. To compute
realized volatilities we also used a moving window of 12 months. Forecasts using
model (7) yielded correlation coe¢cients that where consistently higher than those
using historical volatility.14
3.2.2 Solution of the system of contingent claims equations for the value
of assets and variances of asset returns.
The system of equations (2) and (3) was solved for A and ¾A once for each year and
bank over the period for which data was available. The computer implementation
of the procedure is based on a Mathematica routine that searches for the roots of a
system using the secant method. The roots were robust for initial values within a very
narrow interval around the solution values, but we never encountered the problem of
…nding more than one real root. Outside of the interval, the procedure would simply
not converge even after large numbers of iterations, or would jump to imaginary
roots. Thus we were forced to approach the interval within which we could …nd the
solution using the logic implicit in options model and by trial an error. Once in the
useful interval, we observed a clear consistency between the sequence of numerical
results obtained and the intuition suggested by the derivatives of the options pricing
model.
3.2.3 Explanatory regressions of asset values and risk measures
The purpose of this portion of the study is to attempt to identify the environmental
and management controlled factors that a¤ect asset values and risk exposure. The
procedure is similar to the one used by Hassan, Karels and Peterson [13] but where
the questions being asked are di¤erent. Hassan, et al. seek to explain the e¤ect of
o¤-balance sheet activities on banking risk. We seek to explain the e¤ect of bank
management (other than o¤-balance sheet) and macroeconomic policy on banking
14This conclusion should not be generalized. See Figlewski [6]
16risk. We identify three groups of variables: i) market based control variables that
includes proxies of domestic and United States risk free rate and returns on a market
wide stock index ; ii) environmental factors that include predominantly macroeco-
nomic variables more or less under control of the government and a dummy variable
that accounts for the structural change that represents FL; iii) management factors
that include variables that are generally under control of the bank’s management
such as most bank related …nancial ratios. The variables used in the …rst set are: the
domestic T-Bill rate (when available) or interbank lending rate (kfd), the 3-month
United States T-Bill (kfUS), the domestic stock index returns based on the EMDB
(kmd) and the United States Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index re-
turn (kmUS). The purpose of including the control variables is to …lter the data from
the in‡uence of market wide ‡uctuations –i.e. independent of the speci…c evolution in
the banking sector–, domestic or international. The candidate variables used in the
second set are: a dummy for liberalization (LIB), and a measure of money (MON)
15, the change in consumer price index (INF), the exchange rate (CXR), the …scal
de…cit (FDEF), the balance of trade (BOT) and a measure of the term structure
of interest rates if available 16. As starting point in the selection of …nancial ratios
we used the set of ratios included in the United States Federal Reserve Board Early
Warning System (EWS) and presented in Putnam [29]17 . The data available in
the PACAP base allowed us to compute most –but not all– ratios in the EWS. The
ratios used are those that were possible to compute. They are: return on equity at
market value (ROEM), returns on assets (ROA), net operating income (NOI); loan
ratio (LRIO); claims on government at individual bank level (COG); cash ratio (CR);
Equity to asset ratio at market value (EARM) or equity to asset ratio at book value
(EARB) when the former was not available; a gap management variable, dollar gap
ratio (DGR) and the sensitive funds ratio (SFR); cash dividend ratio (CDR). The
ratios are de…ned with more precision in the Annex1. In the …nal regressions we
eliminated all variable that displayed cross correlations higher than 0.8.
We …rst perform a regressions of the dependent variables A, ¾A, od and P(X)
against the two sets of explanatory variables using an OLS procedure. The model
can be represented as follows:
yB
t = wt¯0 + xt¯1 + zt¯2 + ut (9)
where y represents either A, ¾A, od or P(X), wt, xt and zt represent respectively:
a matrix of market control variables including a vector of 1.0’s, a matrix of variables
15We chose a monetary aggregate variable out of a set of four candidates: M1; quasi-money (time,
savings and foreign currency deposits); reserve money (that consists of the domestic liabilities of
monetary authorities, excluding government deposits) and net claims on central government. Note
that the latter, but at the individual bank level, also appears under the management controlled
variables. We picked the variables that displayed the lowest correlation with other environmental
variables.
16We use the di¤erence between long-term government bond yields and the measure available of
risk free (short-term) rate
17The choice of ratios is, of course, arguable. It is precisely for that reason that we chose a set that
has been selected by the FRB based on its accumulated experience on bank insolvency prediction of
Unites States.
17under management control; and a matrix of environmental variables.
Another question of interest is the relative in‡uence of management-controlled
and environmental (state-controlled) variables on bank asset values and solvency
risk. To determine this relative weight we use a Gauss-Newton regression (GNR). In
essence, the problem of relative weight is similar to a non-nested model speci…cation
test. Suppose that the competing models are:
H1 : yt = xt¯1 + ut and H2 : yt = zt¯2 + vt:
We can perform an arti…cial nesting, in which the two competing regressions are
embedded into a more general model
HC : yt = (1 ¡ ®)xt¯1 + ®zt¯2 + vt: (10)
In this equation ® nests the two models. An ® close to one means that environ-
mental variables dominate management-controlled variables. The problem with this
model is that it is not estimable because not all parameters are separately identi…-
able. In model (10) the intercept and the coe¢cients on the control variables rfd,
rfUS, rmd and rmUS should be present in either formulation. One solution to this
problem was suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon [4]. It consists of replacing ¯2
by ^ ¯2, the OLS estimate of ¯2. Thus , HC becomes
HC : yt = (1 ¡ ®)xt¯1 + ®zt ^ ¯2 + vt: (11)
A test of the null hypothesis that ® = 0 is a standard t-test. We also use the
linear version of this model focusing on the coe¢cient a from the GNR
yt ¡ ^ x = ^ Xb + a(^ z ¡ ^ x) + vt; (12)
where ^ x ´ x(^ ¯) and ^ X ´ X(^ ¯), denoting the matrix of derivatives of x(¯) with
respect to ¯. The test is also a standard t -test. We are interested less in the test on
the coe¢cients ® and a than in the numerical value of these coe¢cients.
Finally we performed (Wald) exclusion tests on the coe¢cients ¯1and ¯2 of re-
gression (9) to test the hypothesis that one of the two set of variables is redundant.
4 Data
We use data from four di¤erent sources: i) The source of yearly bank income state-
ment and balance sheet is the PACAP database (Paci…c-Basin Capital Markets) pro-
duced by the PACAP Research Center, The University of Rhode Island for Malaysia,
Taiwan and Thailand. ii) The source of monthly stock market returns and capital-
ization of domestic banks is also PACAP. iii) Macroeconomic data series including
interest rates, measures of money, government …nances, exchange rates and price
indices. This data was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
for all countries except Taiwan. The Taiwan macro data was obtained from PACAP.
18All data were tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillipe-
Perron tests, and corrected accordingly. In the case of Malaysia, the banks’ …scal year
closed quite randomly. We used for each bank the value of the macroeconomic vari-
able at the month of closure of the …scal year, except for variables that were available
on a yearly basis only. In this case, we used the data of the closest end-of-calendar-
year. iv) The dates and descriptions of FL events. This data was collected from
a wide range of printed and electronic sources that include every possible scienti…c
and journalistic publications to which we had access and time to research, including
World Bank working papers, economic journals, the Financial Times, OECD Eco-
nomic Studies, World Bank Country Studies, and all publications listed in the ABI
Reference Index (that lists among others The Economist, Euromoney, Banker and
several regional business reviews such as Asia Business, etc.).
In studying the institutional development accompanying FL we paid attention to
every form of relaxation of restriction on the …nancial system. However, for statistical
purposes, the event that was taken as key to the FL process is the lifting of controls
on interest rates. For the period following this date the dummy variable LIB was
given the value of 1.0 and 0.0 otherwise. The dates of relevance for the sample of
countries in our study are the following:
Liberalization Dates and Sample Size





Results will be presented in the following order: i) we present some graphs that
illustrate the developments and the evolution of bank solvency variables surrounding
FL; ii) more formally we present results for the estimation of conditional moments;
iii) we present the results of the regression that seek to explain the variations in asset
values and bank solvency measures.
In …gures 1-3 we present the price indices for the banking sector (broken lines)
and the complete domestic market (full lines). The gray regions represent the post-
FL periods. In the case of Malaysia and Thailand we note an overall upward trend
of both price indices following the FL event. The Thai banking index follows quite
closely the market index. This upward trend should not be interpreted as a result of
FL only, but of the whole set of economic reforms that accompany. Below this graph
we have plotted conditional variances estimated with equation (7) for the market-
wide index and the banking index. In the case of Malaysia, volatility was high over
the period of interest rates liberalization between 1978 and 1983, falling afterwards
and raising again following the 1991 event. The 1985-1987 turmoil period appears to
have had a small e¤ect on the volatility of the index. This could be explained by the
fact that insolvency a¤ected a state-owned bank and some smaller private banks. In
19Taiwan, we observe a jump in volatility in both the market and the banking indices.
However the jump appears to be more accentuated for the banking index . A similar
description could be made for Thailand. This is an e¤ect that we will see replicated
at the individual bank level.
In …gures 4-12 we have plotted respectively standard deviation of bank assets,
¾A; bankruptcy probability, P(X) and the estimated deposit insurance premium per
million of dollars, od. The plots include all banks over the periods for which data
were available. The plots of the individual banks replicate quite closely what could
be observed at the index level. In the case of Malaysia, all variables, ¾A, P(X)
and od display peaks in the period 1978-1983, with increases again in the late 1980’s
but generally not after 1991. In the case of Thailand the implied variance of bank
assets is relatively high following the 1980 ”soft” FL. Then it dips through the early
and middle 1980’s. Toward the end of the decade volatilities of some banks increase
dramatically. Then, starting in 1989 and through the end of the sample in 1993,
volatility increases for all banks in the sample.
The use of a conditional moment forecasting model implies that we are assuming
that returns of bank stocks are heteroscedastic. We test this assumption explicitly
performing the GNR suggested by Engle [1982] for all series of bank returns. The
statistic n times the centered R2 is a test of heteroscedasticity distributed Â2(p). We
used p = 6 and obtained evidence of heteroscedasticity for bank series of Malaysia,
Taiwan and Thailand.
We do not report here the coe¢cients obtained from estimating system (7) for
each bank using the GMM procedure. However in Table 2 we present the results of
the GMM estimation of system (7) for the banking and market indices. Thailand
is particularly di¢cult case to predict with almost no variable showing statistical
signi…cance. The case of Malaysia and Taiwan is much easier, with several coe¢cients
statistically di¤erent from zero, including the ARCH term. We also mention a few
details about these estimations for individual banks. To test the overall model we
included a surplus of instrumental variables. In the case of Malaysia and Taiwan in
all estimations the overidenti…cation restrictions test did not reject the orthogonality
conditions used to perform the estimation. In the case of Thailand, in 13 out 16
estimations the overidenti…cation restrictions test did not reject the orthogonality
conditions. This suggests that the model is, overall, adequate. For Malaysia, the
variable in the conditioning set that most often was signi…cant to predict conditional
returns was the lagged US T-Bill (5 out of 8 estimations, with a negative sign) and
the lagged US 10-year bond yield (5/8, negative). In the volatility prediction the
coe¢cient that was most often signi…cant was the own lagged variance (the ARCH
e¤ect, 2/8, positive). For Thailand, the variable in the conditioning set that most
often was signi…cant to predict conditional returns was the lagged own stock return
(8/16 estimations, negative). The second and third places went to the market index
return (5/16, positive) and the US T-Bill (4/16, negative). In the volatility prediction
the coe¢cient that was most often signi…cant was the one corresponding to the US
T-Bill (4/16, negative), followed by exchange rate (3/16, inconsistent signs) and the
domestic in‡ation (3/16, inconsistent sign but mostly positive). All variables were
20lagged. The own lagged variance (the ARCH e¤ect) was signi…cant in only 2/16
estimations.
In Table 3-X we report the results of estimating model (9), (11) and (12). The
last of this set of tables reports the results of a regression that includes the three
countries with dummies for two of them. In this table we have used as dependent
variables A, ¾A, P(X) and od, the latter three, of course, being measures of risk.
In all three cases Thailand, by looking at general statistics it is evident that the
variation in A and ¾A can be relatively well explained, with adjusted R2 ranging
from 72% to 89%. Due to the presence of serial correlation in the regression, we
used the procedure of Newey and West [27] with one lag whenever necessary. Thus
all coe¢cients and test statistics have been computed using a consistent estimate
(corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) of the covariance matrix.18).
The conclusion drawn from the graphs that FL tends to increase asset volatility is
only partially supported by this regression. However there is a positive and signi…cant
relation between FL and ¾A in Malaysia and Taiwan, and positive but not signi…cant
in the case of Thailand. The other two regressions yield somewhat contradictory
results and a low adjusted R2. The regression including the three countries yields the
mos unambiguous results. When taken together, al test indicate a decrease in asset
value and an increase in risk at statistically signi…cant levels.
In terms of the relative weight of management versus macro variables, in the in-
dividual country regressions the majority (7 out of 12) of the coe¢cients tend to be
smaller than 0.5, and those that are larger than 0.5 (5 out of 12), are rarely statis-
tically signi…cant. However, when taking the three countries together, the weights y
suggest that macro variables play a bigger role in determining bank asset values and
risk.
In Table 4, we report the results of the Wald test on the coe¢cients ¯1and ¯2 of
regression (9). With few exceptions (namely Taiwan for P(X) and od; and Thailand
for od) the test for management controlled variables are highly signi…cant and much
larger than those for macro variables. Once again, when taking the three countries
together, the results provide support to the hypothesis that macro variables are more
relevant.
We do not focus on the sign and statistical signi…cance of explanatory variables
other than the variable LIB. However, note the positive and signi…cant relation be-
tween the measures of risk and the DGR, as expected. More interesting is to see
whether following FL management changed its practices and in which way this af-
fected both bank value and risk. To se this we run the same regressions (9) but
added interaction terms between LIB and two risk measures (LRIO, DGR). Details
about the regression are not reported but the main results are the following:19 First,
Durbin Watson statistics tended to be more often within the normal range, suggest-
ing a certain solution to the autocorrelation problem. Second, for both Malaysia
and Taiwan, there is a positive relation between the value of assets and the DGR
18We also included a trend variable in the regression, however it was not signi…cant and was
dropped from the de…nitive estimation reported in Table 3-X.
19Detailled results are available from the authors on request.
21interaction term, and a negative relationship with the LRIO term. This suggests
that the gap management tended to enhance value of the assets but the increase in
credit risk had a negative e¤ect on assets. Third, several coe¢cients for risk interac-
tion terms in risk-measure regressions for Taiwan and one for Thailand were positive
and statistically signi…cant. This provides empirical support, for Taiwan and weakly
for Thailand, that management practices as re‡ected by the LRIO and DGR were
changed so as to increase the risk exposure of banks after FL. To some extent, these
results could also be considered an empirical support for the proposition that moral
hazard increases following FL.20 The interaction coe¢cients where all non-signi…cant
in the all-countries regression.
6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations.
The evidence provided by the empirical analysis carried out in this paper suggests
the following conclusions and policy recommendations:
1. The stock market in which bank shares are traded is an additional instrument
to gage the evolution and health of the banking system in the context of …nancial
liberalization. The market is sensitive to the impact of the FL process on the value
of bank assets (in itself a thermometer of health in the economy) and its solvency
situation. Thus, the market price can be used as an indicator of the impact of the
whole liberalization process and economic cycles on commercial bank performance.
It is of course an open question whether the ”smart economists” of the ministry
of economic a¤airs are ready to concede that prices and implicit valuations re‡ect
the ”aggregated wisdom” of market participants and not just volatile scare-rabbit
response by uninformed investors.
2. Taken together, the results provide a reasonably strong evidence of increase in
bank risk following FL, however measured. Conditional volatility of market-value of
assets, implied probabilities of bankruptcy and deposit insurance premium per dollar
of deposit appear to increase. This implies that the introduction of a FL increases the
possibility of a banking crisis occurring some time after the intiation of the process.
Further, it suggest that supervisory authorities need to scrutinize continuously all
critical variables associated to bank performance following FL, more so than before.
3. The risk exposure of banks is a function of both, variable under control of
management and macroeconomic variables. The e¤ect that management variables
are important in determining risk provides supports to the proposition that moral
hazard (and risk taking) by banks increases following a FL. Given that most of the
banking crisis that followed FL in various countries have generally been blamed on
macroeconomic policy, this research provides empirical support for an alternative ex-
planation. In e¤ect, risk taking behavior by bank managers/owners may be more
important in banking crisis than has been reported. This only emphasizes the impor-
tance of our previous recommendation that regulators an supervisory authorities need
20An alternative proposition would be that bank risk management simply becomes more di¢cult
following FL and that this risk increase is beyond the control of management. However, the Wald
test and the values of weighting coe¢cient, ®, lends this alternative explanation less plausible.
22to keep a very close track of the management practices and risk exposure following
FL.
4. There is little reason to believe that the e¤ects described above are speci…c to
any country. Thus, these conclusions are most probably applicable to any banking
system that goes through a FL process.
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25Table 1
Financial Liberalization: Measures and E¤ects
(Those that are of concern to regulators)
Measures
Elimination of controls Deregulation/regulation Economic reforms Elimination/lowering
on deposit and lending of non-bank …nancial (liberalization of real of barriers to entry
rates markets sector) /exit
E¤ect on banks
*Reduction of charter value *Reduction of charter value *Increased loan portfolio *Reduction of charter
risk value
*Elimination of guaranteed *Disintermediation by *Elimination or reduction
intermediation margin borrowers and depositors of ”conjectural government
guarantees” (CGG)
*Increased interest rate *Volatility in international *Increased competition
volatility that a¤ect the capital ‡ows (hot/cold by new entrants
banks’ interesty rate risk money) a¤ecting share (domestic and foreign)
and gap management risk prices and money stock
*Opportunities for price *Risk associated with new
wars to compete for market business lines (e.g. universal
share banking)
*Increased clients’ *Inccreased competition
bankruptcy risk resulting from quasi-bank …nancial
from higher interest rates. institutions (depository
and non-depository)
E¤ect on banks’ clients
*Increased cost of short *Increased business risk
and long term debt …nan-
cing or re…nancing cost
*Increased risk associated *Elimination or reduction
with …nancial leverage of government induced
rent opportunities
26Table 2
Estimation of Conditional Moments for the Market and Banking
Indices Returns




2[rt;t+¿ ¡ Xt¯]) = Xt°
where Xt is the vector of conditioning variables, and ¾
2[:] is the variance conditional on infor-
mation at time t. The conditioning set consisted of a constant, own returns lagged (kl), the real
exchange rate (XR), U.S. 1-mo T-Bills yield (TB1M), the spread between U.S. 1-mo and 3-mo T-
Bills yields (STB13), the U.S. 10-years Government Bond yield (TB10Y ), domestic in‡ation (INF),
the world dividend yield (DIVw) and a dummy for liberalization (LIB). For the banking index we
also included the returns on the market (kmd), and in the equation for conditional variance we in-
cluded the error on previous periods’ returns (the ARCH e¤ect, ²
2). All variables except LIB were
lagged.
Malaysia Taiwan
Market Banking Market Banking
Variable Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic
General Statistics
DW eq. 1 1.99 - 1.94 - 1.84 - 1.89 -
DW eq. 2 1.94 - 1.67 - 1.81 - 1.87 -
Â
2 0.43 0.51 - - 0.49 0.48
Conditional Returns
Constant 0.280 3.799 0.268 3.298 0.205 2.592 0.224 2.082
km 0.020 0.231 0.464 2.518 0.022 0.199 -0.327 -1.684
XR 0.114 0.552 0.185 0.925 -0.043 -1.636 -0.018 -0.584
TB1M -0.015 -3.860 -0.011 -2.497 -0.001 -0.553 -0.001 -0.375
STB13 0.007 0.895 0.010 1.334 0.012 1.240 0.022 1.517
GB10Y -0.023 -4.450 -0.018 -3.282 -0.000 -0.167 -0.001 -0.215
INF -0.057 -0.051 -0.078 -0.069 -0.007 -0.009 0.128 0.138
DIVw -0.064 -2.205 -0.092 -2.823 -0.096 -2.413 -0.107 -1.996
LIB 0.024 2.043 0.056 3.740 -0.037 -1.446 -0.057 -2.074
kmd 0.055 2.376 0.347 2.263
Conditional Variances
Constant -7.164 -2.719 -5.713 -2.146 -5.459 2.056 -7.775 -3.302
kl -3.693 -0.158 -3.974 -0.399 1.602 -4.137 1.186 1.236
XR -8.582 -0.796 -7.178 -1.654 0.223 1.887 0.161 0.553
TB1M 0.237 1.752 0.095 0.621 0.023 0.749 0.215 1.413
STB13 -0.593 -0.607 -0.487 -1.912 0.132 0.264 0.197 0.687
GB10Y 0.201 0.411 0.019 0.063 0.059 0.681 0.319 1.718
INF 8.414 0.178 19.181 0.749 19.368 0.435 8.355 0.620
DIVw -0.288 -0.518 -0.308 -0.434 -0.337 1.603 -0.152 -0.228
LIB -0.021 -0.038 0.383 0.724 -0.303 -0.572 -1.049 -1.483
²
2
t¡1 -2.919 -0.015 -30.76 -0.143 7.573 2.395 2.782 0.648
27Table 2 (Cont’d)




Variable Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic
General Statistics
DW eq. 1 1.82 - 1.91 -
DW eq. 2 1.41 - 2.37 -
Â
2 0.43 0.51 - -
Conditional Returns
Constant 0.088 0.896 0.116 1.377
km 0.164 1.442 0.128 0.623
XR -0.002 -0.285 -0.001 -0.194
TB1M 0.001 0.101 -0.004 -0.882
STB13 0.006 0.757 0.010 1.271
GB10Y 0.001 0.088 -0.004 -0.674
INF -0.565 -0.631 -0.857 -1.199
DIVw -0.054 -2.145 -0.038 -1.485
LIB -0.002 -0.078 0.036 1.769
kmd 0.012 0.588
Conditional Variances
Constant -1.274 -0.222 -5.033 -1.408
kl -0.649 -0.104 1.678 0.619
XR -0.011 -0.019 0.099 0.300
TB1M -0.451 -1.143 -0.134 -0.573
STB13 -0.272 -0.780 -0.240 -0.618
GB10Y -0.643 -1.150 -0.137 -0.413
INF -0.292 -0.006 20.720 0.948
DIVw -0.099 -0.109 -0.063 -0.065
LIB 1.063 1.289 0.938 1.669
²
2
t¡1 -11.195 -0.543 28.167 1.224
28Table 3- Malaysia
The Determinants of Bank Asset Values and Risk
This table reports the results of the regressions
y
B
t = wt¯0 + xt¯1 + zt¯2 + ut
where y represents either A, Od or P(X), wt, xt and zt represent respectively: a matrix of market
control variables including a vector of 1.0’s, the domestic and US risk free rates, rfd and rfUS, and
the domestic and US market index returns, rmd and rmUS; a set of variables under management
control; and a set of environmental variables. We also run the models:
HC : yt = (1 ¡ ®)xt¯1 + ®zt ^ ¯2 + vt:
yt ¡ ^ x = ^ Xb + a(^ z ¡ ^ x) + vt;
and report the values of ® and a. See the text for an explanation about these regressions. The
coe¢cients imply that the group of variables under control of management have a relative weight in
determining the value of the dependent variable equal to 1¡® (1¡a), while environmental variables
have a relative weight of ® (a). All variables in real terms. Critical t-values of two-sided test for
5% and 10% signi…cance levels are respectively 1.96 and 1.645. ½1 represents the autocorrelation
coe¢cient introduced to correct for serial correlation. .
29logA ¾A P(X) od
Variable Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic
General Statistics
DW 1.25 - 1.25 - 1.70 - 1.97 -
adj. R2 0.79 - 0.84 - 0.12 - 0.06 -
Control Variables
Constant 1.401 1.22 0.189 0.94 -0.756 -0.20 -0.560 -0.14
kmd -0.011 -1.94 0.001 2.11 0.042 1.52 0.041 1.31
kfd -0.007 -0.10 0.007 0.99 0.112 1.14 0.050 0.49
kmUS -0.014 -0.93 -0.001 -2.19 -0.044 -1.21 -0.038 -1.11
kfUS -0.058 -2.21 0.001 0.57 -0.030 -0.85 -0.019 -0.75
Management Controlled Variables
ROEB -3.038 -1.73 0.259 2.85 2.539 0.77 2.759 0.83
ROA 17.376 3.07 -1.755 -7.79 -19.194 -1.64 -17.538 -1.54
LRIO -1.540 -1.46 -0.379 -1.86 -0.815 -0.37 -0.980 -0.40
COG -0.345 -0.21 -0.127 -0.68 -3.324 -1.39 -3.300 -1.39
CR -1.760 -1.74 0.080 1.24 3.573 1.58 3.006 1.42
DGR -1.132 -1.42 0.240 1.41 0.131 0.06 0.329 0.14
EARB 11.070 -6.92 0.776 3.72 6.260 1.30 5.152 1.11
BAR 20.112 2.94 -0.623 -3.15 -13.002 -2.54 -11.214 -2.61
CDR -0.540 -3.58 0.009 0.99 0.059 0.42 0.059 0.45
Environmental Variables
MON -0.0001 -2.01 -0.000 -0.13 -0.000 -0.34 -0.000 -0.49
FDEF -0.0001 -2.32 -0.000 -1.00 -0.000 -0.19 -0.000 -0.40
BOT 0.000 1.15 0.000 1.09 0.000 1.17 0.000 0.84
CXR 0.566 1.07 0.041 1.54 0.349 0.67 0.486 0.88
INF 0.590 0.06 -0.295 -0.49 -23.754 -1.29 -22.872 -1.13
LIB -0.069 -0.57 0.023 3.53 0.444 1.36 0.373 1.30
Relative Weight of Environmental Variables
® 0.41 3.52 0.46 1.61 0.91 1.35 0.92 1.04
a 0.41 3.78 0.46 1.74 0.91 1.46 0.92 1.11
30Table 3- Taiwan (Cont’d)
The Determinants of Bank Asset Values and Risk
logA ¾A P(X) od
Variable Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic
General Statistics
DW 1.13 - 1.81 - 1.59 - 2.02 -
adj. R2 0.89 - 0.72 - 0.51 - 0.24 -
Control Variables
Constant 4.547 3.65 -0.112 -0.59 -0.040 -0.34 -44.079 -0.701
kmd -0.020 -2.45 -0.000 -0.32 -0.000 -0.22 -0.033 -0.072
kfd 0.103 1.98 -0.013 -1.55 -0.009 -1.82 -1.139 -0.486
kmUS -0.026 -2.14 0.006 1.78 0.001 1.02 1.300 1.066
kfUS -0.022 -0.87 -0.001 -0.35 -0.002 -1.02 -0.099 -0.122
Management Controlled Variables
ROEM -3.760 -2.03 -0.363 -0.87 0.037 0.12 33.446 0.31
ROA -32.894 -3.04 -4.397 -0.79 -3.318 -1.13 -2289.2 -1.34
LRIO -3.859 -4.65 -0.267 -2.40 -0.161 -2.64 -76.879 -2.36
COG -4.511 -3.71 0.094 0.64 -0.007 -0.05 35.748 0.60
CR -2.263 -2.14 -0.023 -0.16 -0.111 -1.44 -7.352 -0.17
DGR -1.656 -2.20 0.485 1.84 0.215 1.73 156.95 1.64
EARM -0.128 -0.55 0.232 3.49 0.001 0.03 21.685 1.07
BAR 0.865 0.92 -0.532 -1.76 -0.243 -1.71 -180.38 -1.66
CDR -0.693 -7.15 -0.041 -2.06 -0.025 -2.40 -11.818 -1.79
Environmental Variables
MON 0.000 1.75 -0.000 -0.77 -0.000 -1.30 -0.000 -1.58
CXR 0.020 0.78 -0.011 -1.65 -0.010 -2.77 -4.739 -1.93
INF -0.036 -1.28 0.016 2.57 0.008 2.26 3.042 1.82
LIB -0.176 -1.14 0.036 1.09 0.047 2.20 -2.892 -0.29
Relative Weight of Environmental Variables
® 0.06 0.29 0.11 1.00 0.74 1.53 1.00 13.8
a 0.06 0.21 0.11 1.00 0.74 4.60 1.18 2.36
31Table 3- Thailand (Cont’d)
The Determinants of Bank Asset Values and Risk
logA ¾A P(X) od
Variable Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic
General Statistics
DW 0.98 - 1.79 - 2.12 - 2.27 -
adj. R2 0.75 - 0.84 - 0.19 - 0.13 -
Control Variables
Constant -5.307 -2.17 0.099 2.78 1.359 1.54 0.103 0.60
kmd 0.009 2.07 -0.000 -1.98 -0.012 -1.86 -0.002 -1.33
kfd -0.055 -2.27 -0.000 -1.66 0.004 0.50 0.001 1.01
kmUS -0.008 -0.70 -0.000 -2.35 -0.005 -0.66 -0.001 -1.18
kfUS -0.028 -2.22 -0.000 -2.21 -0.027 -1.93 -0.003 -1.16
Management Controlled Variables
ROEM 7.893 4.10 -0.000 -0.05 -1.305 -1.31 -0.237 -1.18
ROA -60.509 -2.15 -0.459 -0.71 -23.254 -2.07 -2.166 -1.60
NOI 14.833 1.38 -0.021 -0.12 5.383 1.30 0.587 1.01
LRIO 3.178 3.26 -0.022 -1.52 0.558 1.22 0.040 0.84
COG -10.274 -2.47 0.048 0.91 0.132 0.06 0.426 1.22
CR 12.862 4.56 -0.026 -0.83 -1.184 -1.22 -0.239 -1.16
EARM 1.556 1.12 0.380 7.35 -0.162 -0.30 -0.013 -0.14
SFR 5.465 2.29 -0.077 -2.18 -1.421 -1.38 -0.310 -1.37
CDR -0.285 -2.90 -0.000 -3.00 -0.107 -2.31 -0.016 -1.64
Environmental Variables
MON -0.006 -1.63 0.000 1.18 0.007 1.95 0.000 1.32
FDEF -0.000 -1.45 0.000 0.40 0.000 1.63 0.000 1.15
CXR 0.203 4.37 -0.000 -2.38 -0.038 -1.95 -0.002 -1.39
INF 7.470 3.52 -0.026 -0.51 -0.501 -0.46 -0.216 -1.31
LIB 0.166 0.57 0.012 1.90 -0.167 -0.94 -0.021 -0.81
Relative Weight of Environmental Variables
® 0.93 2.39 0.14 2.59 0.20 1.93 0.04 0.25
a 0.93 2.63 0.14 2.44 0.14 1.20 0.04 1.17
32Table 3- All (Cont’d)
The Determinants of Bank Asset Values and Risk
logA ¾A P(X) od
Variable Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic Coe¤ t statistic
General Statistics
DW 0.613 - 1.630 - 1.452 - 1.985 -
adj. R2 0.63 - 0.74 - 0.27 - 0.06 -
Control Variables
Constant 10.279 15.49 0.186 3.32 1.482 3.16 0.876 1.90
Taiwan 2.606 1.77 0.661 2.86 7.251 3.99 4.566 2.06
Thailand 4.063 5.19 0.414 3.66 4.110 4.32 2.613 2.36
kmd -0.002 -0.59 -0.000 -1.34 -0.012 -1.74 -0.004 -0.79
kfd -0.001 -0.04 -0.000 -2.53 -0.022 -0.96 -0.020 -0.88
kmUS -0.027 -2.03 -0.000 -0.46 -0.016 -1.87 -0.008 -0.60
kfUS -0.094 -3.33 0.000 0.85 -0.051 -2.75 -0.026 -2.11
Management Controlled Variables
ROEM 0.051 0.02 -0.497 -3.23 -3.281 -1.24 -2.997 -1.21
ROA -5.089 -1.13 0.425 1.80 1.763 0.78 1.178 0.70
NOI -10.588 -1.30 0.718 1.15 -12.885 -3.74 -8.606 -2.28
LRIO -4.569 -6.22 0.072 1.16 -0.202 -0.49 0.515 1.17
COG -4.598 -3.35 0.297 1.76 1.980 2.49 2.075 1.71
CR 2.789 2.17 -0.020 -0.22 -0.617 -0.94 -0.154 -0.33
EARM 0.060 0.32 0.107 5.83 -0.182 -3.41 -0.066 -1.71
SFR 1.161 2.68 -0.141 -3.10 -0.417 -1.24 -0.510 -1.55
CDR -47.014 -6.15 -0.362 -1.42 -6.604 -1.58 -3.038 -1.02
Environmental Variables
MON 0.000 0.39 -0.000 -1.12 -0.000 -3.48 -0.000 -1.97
MXR -0.005 -0.14 -0.017 -3.03 -0.170 -3.94 -0.112 -2.02
INF 0.130 2.93 -0.000 -1.47 -0.068 -1.77 -0.009 -0.28
LIB 0.204 1.32 0.043 3.87 0.581 5.16 0.269 2.57
Relative Weight of Environmental Variables
® 0.998 1.61 0.96 7.39 0.99 2.54 0.99 1.11
a 1.16 2.04 0.96 6.72 1.15 3.01 1.16 2.06
33Table 4
Wald Tests: all countries
This table reports the results of the Wald test performed on regression coe¢cients ¯1and
¯2 of regression (9)
yB
t = wt¯0 + xt¯1 + zt¯2 + ut
where y represents either A, Od or P(X), wt, xt and zt represent respectively: a matrix
of market control variables including a vector of 1.0’s, the domestic and US risk free rates, rfd
and rfUS, and the domestic and US market index returns, rmd and rmUS; a set of variables
under management control; and a set of environmental variables. The Wald test is a test on
the hypothesis that one of the two set of variables is redundant.
logA ¾A P(X) od
test signif. test signif. test signif. test signif.
Malaysia
Management 81.69 0.000 137.69 0.000 064.91 0.000 4262.8 0.000
Macro 7.25 0.203 42.29 0.000 2.53 0.772 2.15 0.827
Taiwan
Management 619.5 0.000 3204.9 0.000 14.87 0.037 8.11 0.230
Macro 7.386 0.117 24.26 0.000 44.08 0.000 30.31 0.000
Thailand
Management 188.72 0.000 644.89 0.000 9.57 0.386 6.49 0.690
Macro 26.29 0.000 23.80 0.000 9.20 0.101 4.28 0.509
All
Management 286.09 0.000 310.39 0.000 18.92 0.026 5.12 0.823
Macro 4.61 0.202 45.21 0.000 22.53 0.000 9.75 0.020
347 ANNEX
7.1 Data De…nition
In these tables we indicate the source of data used and the name of the series in the
database. I, represents the IMF’s International Financial Statistics; P the PACAP
database; E, the International Finance Corporation’s EMDB; O, ”other,” including
the Morgan Stanley Capital International database and the Financial Time’s
Actuaries database. The country codes are as follows: ”FM”: Malaysia; ”LM”:
Mexico; ”FT”: Taiwan, ”FH”: Thailand and ”AET” when it applies to all countries
except Taiwan, and ”AIT ” when it applies to all countries. 21




Quasy Money Y AET:I-35
Reserve Money Y AET:I-14
Claims on Government Y AET:I-32an
Price Index Y AET:I-64
Exchange rate (local/$US) M-Y AET:I-ae
Balance of trade Y AET:I-70,71
Fiscal de…cit Y AET:I-80
Market variables
Domestic bond yield M-Y AET:I-61
Domestic risk-free rate M-Y AET:I-60b
Domestic bank index M FM,FT,FH:P-0002; LM:EMDB
Domestic market-wide index M-Y FM,FT,FH:P-1000; LM:EMDB
U.S. bond yield M-Y AIT:O
U.S. risk-free rate (3MTB) M-Y AIT:O
U.S. 1-mo TBill M-Y AIT:O
U.S. market-wide index M-Y AIT:O
World dividend yield M AIT:O
21The reason for this distinction is that the International Financial Statistics does not report
Taiwan data.
357.2 Financial Ratios
The following is the list of ratios that consititute the FRB early warning system
(EWS), following Putnam (1993). Not all ratios were available. The ratios for
which data was available di¤ered from country to country. The ratios actually used








Net operating income (NOI) = Total operating income-Total operating expenses
Total assets

























Loan ratio (LRIO)= Total loans
Total assets










Cash and securities ratio (CSR)= Cash plus securities held
Total assets
4. Gap management












Foreign debt (FD)= Foreign debt
Total assets
Sensitive Funds Ratio (SFR) = Interest rate sesistive funds
Total sources of funds
36Figure 1
MALAYSIA: Price indices and volatility
MALAYSIAN INDICES (In real terms)







CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF MARKET INDEX








CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF BANKING INDEX









TAIWAN: Price indices and volatility
TAIWAN INDICES (In real terms)









CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF MARKET INDEX









CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF BANKING INDEX







THAILAND: Price indices and volatility
THAILAND INDICES (In real terms)
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CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF BANKING INDEX
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